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THE ROLE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTROL MECHANISMS FOR 




Previous research in operations has emphasized the importance of internal integration for firm 
performance.  This  study  shifts  the  focus  to  determinants  of  internal  integration  and 
experimentally investigates the role of management control mechanisms for the integration of 
marketing information about customer preferences in supplier selection decisions. To derive our 
hypotheses, we draw upon relational  framing theory and the distinction between formal and 
informal  control  mechanisms.  Our  experiment  manipulates  two  types  of  formal  control 
mechanisms and the informal control mechanism so that each control mechanism either evokes a 
group  or  an  individual  frame.  With  respect  to  the  different  combinations  of  formal  control 
mechanisms,  we  show  that  only  the  combination  in  which  both  formal  control  mechanisms 
evoke  a  group  frame  lead  to  a  high  degree  of  customer-oriented  supplier  selections.  More 
importantly, we show that the informal control mechanism is driving the degree of customer-
oriented supplier selections when formal control mechanisms evoke conflicting frames, while the 
informal  control  mechanism  does  not  lead  to  any  difference  when  both  formal  control 
mechanisms  evoke  a  group  frame.  Our  results  contribute  to  the  literature  about  internal 
integration and the management control literature. 
 
 










Internal integration, which is the degree to which different functional departments of a firm work 
together  in  order  to  fulfill  customer  requirements,    focuses  on  the  breakdown  of  functional 
barriers,  the  alignment  of  functional  strategies  and  the  development  of  synchronized  and 
integrated processes (Flynn et al., 2009; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Pagell, 2004). Previous 
research has provided evidence about the importance of internal integration. Germain and Iyer 
(2006), for instance, found that internal integration improved financial performance while Flynn 
et al. (2009) and Zhao et al. (2010) observe that internal integration is a necessary requirement to 
reap the full benefits of external integration with customers and suppliers. Given the importance 
of internal integration, a natural question to ask is how internal integration can be improved. 
There is, however, a paucity of studies about the determinants of internal integration. On the 
other  hand,  research  remains  silent  about  integration  between  marketing  and  purchasing. 
Integration  between  marketing,  which  has  knowledge  about  customer  preferences,  and 
purchasing, which selects suppliers, is however important as the preferences of customers, which 
are the most important assets of firms, should be taken into account when selecting suppliers 
(Sheth et al., 2009). This study tries to fill these gaps in the literature by experimentally studying 
the  influence  of  management  control  mechanisms  on  the  integration  of  customer-related 
information in supplier selection decisions. 
We rely on relational framing theory to derive our hypotheses. Relational framing theory 
posits that individuals do not behave in a strictly self-interested manner but contingent on the 
framing of the social situation (Tetlock and McGraw, 2005). As control mechanisms frame the 
social  situation  of  a  cross-functional  interface  by  creating  or  removing  boundaries  between 
functional departments, the theory is well-suited to make directional hypotheses about the role of 4 
 
control  mechanisms  in  the  purchasing-marketing  interface.  Our  study  also  extends  relational 
framing theory by introducing the distinction between formal control mechanisms, which are 
installed  top-down,  and  the  informal  control  mechanism,  which  is  socially  constructed,  and 
making predictions about the importance of informal control mechanism for different types of 
combinations  of  formal  control  mechanisms.  More  specific,  we  make  a  distinction  between 
formal control mechanisms that are congruent with each other (i.e. formal control mechanisms 
send out the same message) and formal control mechanisms that are not congruent with each 
other  (i.e.  formal  control  mechanisms  send  out  a  conflicting  message).  This  distinction  is 
relevant  as  firms  often  switch  between  equilibrium  conditions,  under  which  formal  control 
mechanisms are assumed to be congruent, and disequilibrium conditions, under which formal 
control mechanisms are not necessarily congruent.  
The results emphasize the importance of formal and informal control mechanisms for 
increasing internal integration. We first show show that a high degree of internal integration is 
only attainable if both formal control mechanisms are congruent. More importantly, we find that 
the informal control mechanism is the main determinant of internal integration if formal control 
mechanisms send out conflicting messages, while the informal control mechanism does not lead 
to  any  differences  when  both  formal  control  mechanisms  are  focused  on  optimizing  the 
performance of the firm as a whole. Consistent with our theory, we find that subjects in case of 
conflicting formal control mechanisms consciously rely on the informal control mechanism and 
that the informal control mechanism reframes the formal control mechanism that is not in line 
with  the  message  of  the  informal  control  mechanism.  By  explicitly  focusing  on  different 
combinations of formal control mechanisms, these results shed new insights on the interaction 5 
 
between formal and informal control mechanisms and can explain the mixed evidence from prior 
literature about the importance of formal versus informal control mechanisms. 
As  we  will  proxy  internal  integration  by  the  degree  to  which  information  from  the 
marketing department is integrated in supplier selection decisions, we begin by describing the 
interface between purchasing and marketing. This is followed by an overview of the theoretical 
background of this study. The third section of this study contains the experimental design. The 
results are presented in the fourth section. We conclude this paper with a thorough discussion of 
the results and some suggestions for further research. 
 
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The purchasing-marketing interface 
Although a lot of interfaces have been examined, the purchasing-marketing interface has been 
largely  neglected  in  the  literature  (Ivens  et  al.,  2009;  Sheth  et  al.,  2009)
2.  However,  recent 
evolutions  point  at  the  importance  of  a  close  integration  between  purchasing  and  marketing 
(Zhao et al. 2010). First, supply-driven supply chains have been evolved into demand-driven 
supply chains that take the customer preferences as starting point for supply chain optimizations 
(Heikkilä, 2002; Jüttner et al., 2007). Marketing departments fulfill an important role in demand-
driven  supply  chains  as  they  have  a  lot  of  information  about  customer  preferences  and 
knowledge about how to enhance customer satisfaction and customer loyalty (Moorman and 
                                                 
2  Previous  research  has  investigated  different  cross-functional  interfaces  such  as  the  marketing-manufacturing 
interface (Kahn and Mentzer, 1996; O’Leary-Kelly and Flores, 2002), the marketing-logistics interface (Ellinger, 
2000), the marketing-R&D interface (Maltz et al., 2001) and the purchasing-manufacturing interface (Pagell and 
Krause, 2002). Although internal integration refers to the alignment of different functional departments, researchers 
often  focus  on  the  interface  between  two  functional  departments  because  such  an  approach  facilitates  the 
identification of factors that can influence the relationship between internal integration and performance. 6 
 
Rust, 1999; Verhoef and Leeflang, 2009). Second, firms are focusing on their core competencies 
and are increasingly relying on externally supplied goods and services (Cox et al., 2005). Given 
the  importance  of  customer  preferences  in  demand-driven  supply  chains,  purchasers  should 
integrate customer preferences in their supplier selection decisions.  
  Integrating customer preferences in supplier selections, however, will change the nature 
of supplier selection decisions. Traditionally, suppliers were selected and evaluated based on the 
total cost that a supplier caused in the supply chain (Plank and Ferrin, 2002). Companies also 
developed mathematical tools such as Total Cost of Ownership to better approximate the total 
cost of a supplier. Requiring that customer preferences are integrated when selecting suppliers 
implies that suppliers can also generate revenues by delivering components that match with the 
customer preferences and as such increase customer satisfaction. Put differently, a customer-
oriented supplier selection is a decision that optimizes the trade-off between the total costs that a 
supplier causes in the buying firm, which are realized in the upstream part of the supply chain, 
and the revenues generated by the supplier, which are realized in the downstream part of the 
supply  chain  (Wouters  et  al.,  2005).  Optimizing  the  trade-off  between  upstream  costs  and 
downstream revenues, however, is not easy because this trade-off happens in the purchasing-
marketing  interface  which  is  characterized  by  an  information  and  operating  externality.  The 
existence of externalities is a logic consequence of customer-responsive strategies as pursuing 
such  strategies  intensifies  interdependencies  between  functional  departments  (Bouwens  and 
Abernethy, 2000; Chenhall, 2008).   
  The origin of the information externality in the purchasing-marketing interface is linked 
to the fact that marketing has information about customer preferences and the revenue-generating 
possibilities  of  suppliers,  while  the  purchasing  department  needs  this  information  to  make 7 
 
customer-oriented  supplier  selections  (Zhao  et  al.,  2010).  In  other  words,  information  about 
customer preferences should be disseminated to the purchasing department and should also be 
understandable for employees from the purchasing department so that they can integrate the 
information about the revenue-generating possibilities with the information about the costs that a 
supplier  causes  in  a  supply  chain.  The  operating  externality  in  the  purchasing-marketing 
interface is caused by the fact that supplier selections influence the performance of the marketing 
department as externally supplied goods and services influence satisfaction of the end customer, 
which  is  an  important  performance  metric  of  the  marketing  department  (Sheth  et  al.,  2009; 
Verhoef and Leeflang, 2009). Christie et al. (2003) argue that the presence of an information and 
an operating externality lead to the maximization of departmental profits, which is suboptimal 
for the firm as a whole. Put differently, customer-oriented supplier selections, which should be 
observed in perfectly internally integrated firms, are exceptional in firms where total cost is the 
priority for purchasing and where information exchange between marketing and purchasing is 
limited.  The  crucial  question  remains  therefore  to  identify  solutions  that  can  mitigate  the 
negative consequences of these externalities. 
Control mechanisms 
Management  control  literature  argues  that  the  implementation  of  suitable  formal  control 
mechanisms can mitigate the negative consequences of information and operating externalities 
(Christie et al., 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Rowe, 2004). Formal control mechanisms 
include the more visible, objective components of a control system such as incentive systems, 
information systems and standard operating procedures (Anthony et al., 1989; Langfield-Smith, 
2007). Relying on the premises of the management control literature, we argue that the provision 
of understandable information about customer preferences and revenue-generating possibilities 8 
 
to  employees  from  the  purchasing  department  as  well  as  making  them  responsible  for  the 
revenues  that  the  selected  suppliers  generate,  will  increase  the  number  of  customer-oriented 
supplier  selections.  In  a  similar  vein,  Zhao  et  al.  (2010)  argue  that information  sharing  and 
coordination mechanisms can increase integration between purchasing and marketing. 
The negative consequences of the information externality in the purchasing-marketing 
interface  can  be  mitigated  by  the  provision  of  understandable  information  about  the 
consequences  of  selecting  a  particular  supplier  for  the  firm’s  revenues  and  its  customer 
satisfaction  (Jüttner  et  al.,  2007).  However,  information  that  is  exchanged  between  different 
departments is often expressed in a typical functional language and difficult to understand for 
employees from other functional departments (Rowe et al., 2008). Recent research has shown 
that  monetary  quantification  of  the  consequences  of  a  decision  provides  benefits  when  the 
consequences of this decision are dispersed over different functional departments (Wouters and 
Verdaasdonk,  2002).  Monetary  quantification  of  the  downstream  consequences  of a  supplier 
selection  implies  the  calculation  of  the  expected  revenues  associated  with  the  selection  of  a 
particular supplier (Kadous et al., 2005) and facilitates the comparison of the costs and benefits 
that are associated with different suppliers as it translates the diverse consequences into a single 
financial unit of measurement (Galbraith, 1973). Wouters et al. (2009), for instance, found that 
monetary quantification plays an important role for selecting appropriate suppliers during new 
product development while Rowe et al. (2008) provide field evidence that translating the various 
consequences of a decision in a common language such as money improves cross-functional 
decision-making.  
The  negative  consequences  of  the  operating  externality  in  the  purchasing-marketing 
interface can be mitigated by an incentive system that recognizes the influence of a supplier on 9 
 
the firm’s costs as well as on its revenues (Pagell, 2004). Making purchasers responsible for the 
revenues that the selected suppliers generate should help them to optimize the trade-off between 
the  total  costs  and  the  revenue-generating  possibilities  of  the  supplier
3.  However,  previous 
research  has  found  that  acquisition  price  and  total  costs  are  the  most important  elements  of 
incentive systems for purchasing employees (Anderson and Chambers, 1985; Dumond, 1994). 
Aggregate performance measures such as firm profit can instigate an optimal trade-off between 
the costs and revenues of a supplier as previous research has shown that aggregate performance 
measure  increase  firm  value  when  interdependencies  between  functional  departments  and 
business units increase or when they have to pursue a common goal such as customer satisfaction 
(Bushman et al., 1995; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 2009) 
4.  
Relational framing theory   
The  theoretical  predictions  about  the  effect  of  different  combinations  of  formal  control 
mechanisms on the degree of customer-oriented supplier selections will be grounded in relational 
framing theory (Tetlock and McGraw, 2005). Relational framing theory posits that individuals 
do not behave in a strictly self-interested manner but contingent on the framing of the social 
situation (Messick, 1999). While boundaries between individuals evoke an individual frame and 
competitive,  self-interested  behavior,  the  absence  of  boundaries  stirs  up  a  group  frame  and 
cooperative,  group-interested  behavior.  Relational  framing  theory  can  be  used  to  derive 
                                                 
3 Although employees from the purchasing department cannot directly control the firm’s revenues, Lambert (2001) 
and Holmstrom (1979) argue that performance metrics are informative for rewarding purposes if the actions of the 
agent influence the probability distribution of the performance metric. Merchant and Otley (2007) also propose to 
incorporate  performance  metrics  that  the  agent  can  influence  without  directly  controlling  them.  As  selecting  a 
supplier can influence the firm’s revenues and profits, integrating these measures in reward systems for purchasers 
can thus be valuable. 
4 Aggregate performance measures are measured at an organizational level higher than the employee’s department 
level. Local or departmental performance measures are the logical counterpart of aggregate performance measures 
(Bushman et al., 1995). 10 
 
hypotheses about the role of control mechanisms in the purchasing-marketing interface because 
control mechanisms create or remove boundaries between functional departments (Briers and 
Chua, 2001; Rowe, 2004).  
Based on relational framing theory  and the characteristics of the  control mechanisms 
described  earlier,  we  posit  that  monetary  quantified  information  about  the  downstream 
consequences of suppliers and a reward system that relies on aggregate performance measures 
will evoke a group frame and cooperative behavior. On the other hand, information about the 
downstream consequences of suppliers in a typical marketing language and a reward system that 
relies on local performance measures will evoke an individual frame and competitive behavior. 
The presence of two formal control mechanisms to mitigate the negative consequences of the 
externalities in the purchasing-marketing interface results in four combinations of formal control 
mechanisms: one combination in which both control mechanisms evoke an individual frame, one 
combination in which both control mechanisms evoke a group frame and two combinations in 
which one control mechanism evokes a group frame while the other control mechanism evokes 
an individual frame.  
Psychological  and  accounting  research  have  already  examined  the  problem  of  mixed 
frames and have shown that a conflict between the individual and the group frame will lead to 
the dominance of the individual frame (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Gaertner et a., 2002; Rowe, 
2004). In other words, if formal control mechanisms send out mixed cues about the situation, 
individuals will rely on the individual frame to make decisions. As a result, incongruent formal 
control  mechanisms  will  lead  to  supplier  selections  that  optimize  the  performance  of  the 
purchasing department, but harms the performance of the company as a whole. 11 
 
Relying  on  the  above  theory,  we  expect  that  only  the  combination  of  monetary  quantified 
information  and  aggregate  performance  measures  will  result  in  a  high  degree  of  customer-
oriented  supplier  selections.  In  the  three  other  combinations  of  formal  control  mechanisms, 
people will rely on the individual frame which will result in a low degree of customer-oriented 
supplier selections.     
   
Hypothesis 1 Combinations of formal control mechanisms that both evoke a group frame will 
lead to a higher degree of customer-oriented supplier selections than combinations of formal 
control  mechanisms  that  both  evoke  an  individual  frame  or  combinations  of  formal  control 
mechanisms that evoke a mixed frame. 
 
Relational framing theory provides us with a strong expectation regarding people’s behavior by 
arguing that the individual frame will dominate if mixed frames are evoked. Turner et al. (1994), 
however, argue that the way people perceive themselves and make their decisions is also socially 
constructed. Consistent with this reasoning, Messick (1999) contends that people’s interpretation 
of a situation is not only influenced by the underlying economic structure, which is created by 
the formal control mechanisms, but also by the larger context in which the economic structure is 
embedded. Although these statements do not reject the dominance of the individual frame, they 
imply that the strength of the dominance of the individual frame is determined by the social 
context, which is neglected in relational framing theory until now.  
Management control theory also emphasizes the importance of the social context and 
considers the social context as an informal control mechanism, which can be described as the 
combination of informal socialization mechanisms that take place in an organization and that 12 
 
facilitate  shared  values,  beliefs  and  understandings  among  organizational  members 
(Govindarajan and Fisher, 1980; Ouchi, 1980; Turner and Makhija, 2006). In general, one can 
make a distinction between an informal control mechanism that promotes integration between 
functional departments to fulfill customer needs and an informal control mechanism that does 
not stimulate integration between different functional departments (Homburg et al., 2007; Maltz 
et  al.,  2001).  While  the  first  type  of  informal  control  installs  a  common  identity  between 
members  from  different  functional  departments  so  that  employees  from  other  functional 
departments are considered as members from the own group, the second type of informal control 
leads to the development of a different identity for different functional departments such that 
employees from other functional departments are considered as members from another group. 
Empirical research has already shown that the informal control mechanism influences decision-
making, frames behavior and outcomes, mitigates different types of control problems and helps 
to  install  a  high  degree  of  customer-related  responsiviness  (Homburg  et  al.,  2007;  Sprinkle, 
2003; Langfield-Smith, 2007). The influence of the informal control mechanism for different 
combinations of formal control mechanisms (congruent versus not congruent) has, however, not 
been covered by current research. We will first predict the influence of the informal control 
mechanism when formal control mechanisms send out conflicting messages. 
  Our starting point is that people who are confronted with incongruent formal control 
mechanisms will consciously rely on the informal control mechanism to guide their decisions. In 
this perspective, psychological research already documented that people consciously look for a 
more  solid  base  of  decision-making  in  case  of  ambiguity  (Smith  and  Henry,  1996).  This 
argument is also in line with Ouchi (1980) who argues that the informal control mechanism is the 
sole form of mediation when formal control mechanisms fail due to ambiguity. 13 
 
  The conscious reliance on the informal control mechanism in case of incongruent formal 
control mechanisms will then lead to the reframing of the formal control mechanism that is not in 
line with the informal control mechanism. With respect to the reframing of incentive systems 
that are not in line with the informal norms, Turner and Makhija (2006) argue that informal 
socialization  mechanisms  inspire  high  goal  congruence  and  common  interests  among 
organizational members. Furthermore, good informal relationships between different functional 
departments improve insights about how decisions in different functional departments relate to 
one another which increases the belief of employees that they can influence outcomes together 
(Wech et al., 1998). Research in economics and social psychology also documents that people 
have  preferences  to  stick  to  the  social  norms  at  the  expense  of  personal  wealth  (Eckel  and 
Grossman, 2005). Taken together, an informal control mechanism that promotes cross-functional 
integration will increase the importance and salience of common goals, while an informal control 
mechanism  that  does  not  stimulate  integration  between  different  functional  departments 
strengthens the importance of departmental goals. 
Informal control mechanisms also have the ability to reframe information that conveys 
another message than the social context. Daft and Weick (1984) and Huber (1991), for instance, 
contend  that  information  is  given  meaning  in  accordance  with  existing  organizational 
understandings. Consistent with this conjecture, White et al. (2003) found that the interpretation 
of information is influenced by the shared values and beliefs of the social setting. Research in 
social psychology also emphasizes the importance of the social situation for the interpretation 
and evaluation of information (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1994). Birnbaum et al. 
(1976), for instance, found that the credibility of the information source influences the use and 
weight of information for decision-making. Lastly, Turner and Makhija (2006) argue that the 14 
 
existence  of  a  common  identity  between  employees  from  different  functional  departments 
stimulates the use of diverse knowledge and helps to develop a common interpretation of the 
diverse  knowledge.  In  sum,  current  literature  suggests  that  information  about  the  revenue-
generating  possibilities  of  suppliers  will  be  more  easily  integrated  if  the  informal  control 
mechanism promotes cross-functional integration. 
Relying on the basic premise of relational framing theory and on the hypothesis that the 
strength of the dominance of the individual frame is socially constructed, we argue that the 
reframing by the informal control mechanism will weaken the dominance of the individual frame 
if  the  informal  control  mechanism  promotes  cross-functional  integration  and  strengthen  the 
dominance of the individual frame if the informal control mechanism does not stimulate cross-
functional integration. Consistent with the argument that relational framing theory does not make 
a distinction between different combinations of incongruent formal control mechanisms, we posit 
that the influence of the informal control mechanism will be the same for different combinations 
of incongruent formal control mechanisms. In other words, we expect that the reframing of an 
incentive system that is not in line with the common understandings between employees will 
have the same influence on the degree of customer-oriented supplier selections as the reframing 
of information about the revenue-generating possibilities of suppliers. Our hypothesis is thus as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The decreasing effect of incongruent formal control mechanisms on the degree of 




Relational framing theory argues that if both formal control mechanisms evoke the same frame, 
this frame will drive the behavior of employees. The question arises whether an informal control 
mechanism  that  is  (not)  in  line  with  the  message  of  the  formal  control  mechanisms  can 
strengthen (weaken) the frame of the formal control mechanisms. Contrary to the situation in 
which the formal control mechanisms evoke a conflicting frame, formal control mechanisms 
send out a clear message which will eliminate the conscious reliance on the informal control 
mechanism. However, Lembke and Wilson (1998) argue that relying on the social context to 
make decisions is also an unconscious process. As a result, we argue that an informal control 
mechanism  that  is  in  line  with  the  message  of  the  formal  control  mechanism  will  have  an 
additional  effect  on  the  degree  of  customer-oriented  supplier  selections  due  to  unconscious 
relying  on  the  social  context.  In  other  words,  an  informal  control  mechanism  that  promotes 
cross-functional integration will increase the degree of customer-oriented supplier selections if 
both formal control mechanisms evoke a group frame, while an informal control mechanism that 
does  not  promote  cross-functional  integration  will  decrease  the  degree  of  customer-oriented 
supplier  selections  if  both  formal  control  mechanisms  evoke  an  individual  frame.  This 
expectation is consistent with Bhimani (2003) who shows that consistency between the social 
identity of employees and the purpose of formal control mechanisms increases implementation 
success. Hackman (1992) also shows that social norms have an amplification quality as they 
strengthen the dominant messages communicated by other mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 3: The increasing (decreasing) effect on the degree of customer-oriented supplier 
selections  of  formal  control  mechanisms  that  both  evoke  a  group  (individual)  frame  is 
strengthened  by  an  informal  control  mechanism  that  (does  not)  promotes  cross-functional 
integration. 16 
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  three  hypotheses  are  rooted  in  relational  framing  theory. 
Hypothesis 1 only considers formal control mechanisms and is a test of the basic premise of 
relational framing theory. Hypothesis 2 and 3 expands relational framing theory and argue that 
the role of the informal control mechanism is dependent on the combination of formal control 
mechanisms. Mixed frames will lead to a conscious reliance on the social context and a dominant 
influence of the social context on the degree of customer-oriented supplier selections. Congruent 
frames, on the other hand, will lead to an unconscious reliance on the social context and an 
additive influence of social context on the degree of customer-oriented supplier selections. 
 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
We  designed  a  scenario-based  experiment  in  which  we  manipulated  the  incentive  system 
(aggregate performance measure versus localized performance measure), the information format 
of  the  downstream  consequences  of  suppliers  (monetary  quantified  information  versus 
information  in  a  functional  language)  and  the  informal  control  mechanism  (high  versus  low 
integration between functional departments) to test our hypotheses. As each variable has two 
conditions  and  either  evokes  an  individual  or  group  frame,  we  have  eight  experimental 
conditions. We had three main reasons for using an experiment. First, selecting suppliers is a 
complex decision that is influenced by a lot of factors. An experiment gives us the possibility to 
manipulate  the  constructs  of  theoretical  interest  and  to  keep  all  other  exogenous  influences 
constant. Second, congruence between formal control mechanisms is an important aspect of our 
study. By using an experiment, we can create situations in which formal control mechanisms are 
congruent or not. Third, studies about relational framing theory often use experiments (Rowe, 17 
 
2004; Tetlock & McGraw, 2005). As we want to extend relational framing theory, an experiment 
is the most suitable research method. 
Subjects 
367  undergraduate  students  (average  age:  20.5  years)  of  a  large  West-European  university 
participated in the experiment. All participants have followed courses in operations management, 
marketing and management accounting and are familiar with concepts such as supplier selection, 
total cost of ownership, customer satisfaction and customer value. Participants received a course 
credit and they could win film tickets. They were informed that that the probability of winning a 
film ticket increased with increasing performance on the experimental task. The film tickets were 
assigned to the four best performing subjects of each condition (MacIntyre and Ryans, 1983). 
Procedure 
The experiment was programmed in Authorware so that subjects could make their decisions on 
computer. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental conditions
5. The 
experiment consists of three phases. During the first phase of the experiment, subjects read the 
experimental scenario and were assigned the role of a purchaser of a company that produces and 
sells parquet floors. Subjects had to select a new supplier of wood because the current supplier 
has stopped the production of wood for parquet floors. It was further mentioned that wood is a 
key  component  for  parquet  floors  and,  as  such,  an  important  determinant  of  customer 
satisfaction. The scenario further explained the incentive system, the meaning of the information 
about the revenue-generating possibilities of suppliers and the informal control mechanism. At 
                                                 
5 Males (n=233) and females (n=134) are equally divided over the experimental conditions so that our results cannot 
be biased by gender effects. Furthermore, there are no differences between experimental conditions with respect to 
age (F=0.36, p>0.90), motivation (F=1.68, p>0.10), preference for film tickets (F=0.69, p>0.68) and grades from 
previous years (F=0.85, p>0.54). 18 
 
the end of the experimental scenario, we clearly explained how subjects can earn points that will 
be used to assign film tickets. The experimental scenario was dispersed over different screens 
and subjects could read each screen as long as they want, but they cannot go back to earlier 
screens. 
During the second phase of the experiment, subjects had to make six supplier selections
6. 
They  had  to  make  a  choice  between  two  suppliers  and  received  total  cost  information  and 
information  about  the  revenue-generating  possibilities  for  each  supplier
7.  Subjects  in  the 
different conditions received the same total cost information, which was given by one number, 
but  depending  on  their  condition,  they  received  information  about  the  revenue-generating 
possibilities either in monetary form or in a typical marketing language. Both manipulations of 
the  information  about  the  revenue-generating  possibilities  are  economically  equivalent  and 
should lead to the same supplier choice. Each supplier selection was presented on one screen. 
Participants could look at each screen as long as they want, but they could not go back. In order 
to avoid order effects, the sequence of the six supplier selections was randomized. 
Subjects had to indicate their purchase intention for one of both new suppliers by moving 
a slider over a horizontal bar
8. By doing this, they divided 100 points between the two new 
                                                 
6 The six supplier selections differed from each other with respect to the movements of the total costs towards the 
current supplier. In two supplier selections, the total cost of both suppliers was higher compared to the total cost of 
the current supplier, in two supplier selections the total cost of both suppliers was lower compared to the total cost of 
the current supplier and in two supplier selections the total cost of one supplier was higher while the total cost of the 
other supplier was lower compared to the current supplier. Within each group of two supplier selections, there was 
one supplier selection in which the movements of the total cost of both suppliers were in a small range and one 
supplier selection in which the movements of the total costs were in a large range compared to the total cost of the 
current supplier. We differed the movements of the total cost to avoid that the results are driven by a particular 
movement of the total cost. The Cronbach α of the six supplier selections is 0.91 so that we can conclude that the 
different supplier selections measure the same construct. 
7 Although we do not give costs for the different components of the total costs, we clearly indicated that purchasing 
costs, costs of waste, store costs and order and administrative costs are included in the total cost of each supplier. 
8 Marketing research has already shown that purchase intention scales are good predictors of real buying behaviour 
(Wright and MacRae, 2008). 19 
 
suppliers. The more points they gave at a supplier, the higher their purchase intention for that 
supplier. The use of the sliderbar had the advantage that subjects cannot make calculation errors 
by dividing 100 points between the two suppliers. Subjects were informed that the division of 
100 points over the two suppliers will be used to assign film tickets. If one assigned more than 
50 points to the correct supplier based on his incentive system, then one earned that number of 
points.  However,  if  one  assigned  more  than  50  points  to  the  wrong  supplier  based  on  his 
incentive system, then the number of points that is assigned to the wrong supplier was subtracted 
from the total number of points. If one was indifferent between two suppliers, then one could 
earn nor loose points. So, only the majority of the points that were assigned to a supplier were 
taken into account to calculate the total number of points. We linked the external reward to the 
incentive  system  because  earlier  research  has  shown  that  incentive  systems  are  the  most 
important driver of purchaser’s behavior (Dumond 1994). 
The  third  phase  of  the  experiment  was  an  ex-post  questionnaire  that  consisted  of 
manipulation checks, general questions about perception of the marketing department and the 
marketing  information,  questions  with  respect  to  emotional  feelings  towards  the  marketing 
department  and  identification  questions.  We  also  asked  questions  about  the  strength  of  the 
incentive  system,  information  about  revenue-generating  possibilities  and  informal  control 
mechanism to create (remove) boundaries between both departments. For the ex-post questions, 
we used the same sliderbar of 100-points as in the supplier selections. The subjects assigned a 
high score to questions about motivation to score well on the task (average=63, median=62), 
clarity  of  the  experimental  scenario  (average=78,  median=76),  entering  into  the  scenario 
(average=65,  median=69)  and  enjoying  oneself  with  the  experimental  task  (average=60, 20 
 
median=61). Scores on these questions do also not significantly differ between experimental 
conditions (F > 0.15 for all tests). 
Manipulations 
The incentive system is manipulated by a local or an aggregate performance measure (Bushman 
et al., 1995; Dumond,  1994; Plank and  Ferrin, 2002)  (see Appendix 1, Panel A). The local 
performance measure, which evokes an individual frame, is based on the difference between the 
total cost of a supplier and 10% of the revenues that a supplier will generate if that particular 
supplier is selected. In other words, the local performance measure is largely based on the total 
cost of a supplier and should motivate subjects to select the supplier that minimizes the total cost 
of  a  supplier  and,  as  such,  optimizes  the  performance  of  the  purchasing  department.  The 
aggregate performance measure, which evokes a group frame, is based on the difference between 
the revenues that a supplier will generate if he is selected and the total cost of the supplier. As 
such, the aggregate performance measure is based on the profit that a supplier can generate and 
this should motivate subjects to choose a supplier that optimizes the performance of the company 
as a whole. Subjects that have a(n) local (aggregate) performance measure are informed that the 
lower (higher) they score on the incentive formula, the better their performance is. Note that the 
revenues that a supplier can generate, differ between the two suppliers as the wood of a supplier 
can decrease or increase customer satisfaction which influences the firm’s revenues.  
The information about the revenue-generating possibilities of a supplier was manipulated 
by giving this information in a monetary form or by means of rankings (see Appendix 1, Panel 
B).  The  monetary  quantified  information  should  be  easier  to  understand  and  evoke  a  group 
frame. The rankings should be difficult to understand and this should reflect the difficulties that 
purchasing employees encounter when they receive information in a typical marketing language. 21 
 
The use of rankings is consistent with the idea that marketing managers often have intuitive 
conceptions about the supplier that is preferred by the customers while they do not know the 
monetary  difference  between  the  two  suppliers.  Subjects  were  further  informed  that  the 
purchased component has three important characteristics (durability, strength and maintenance) 
that could decrease or increase customer satisfaction. They were further informed that the three 
characteristics  have  equal  importance  and  that  the  revenues  are  dependent  on  customer 
satisfaction.  The  monetary  quantified  information  indicates  the  revenues  that  the  firm  will 
generate if a particular supplier is chosen. For instance, if they choose for supplier A (B) then the 
firm’s revenues will increase with 7 200 EUR (1 800 EUR). The rankings indicate the relative 
position of a supplier for each of the three characteristics of the component. Each supplier has a 
ranking (one, two or three) for each of the three characteristics and the rankings are constructed 
in such a way that the supplier that generates the largest revenues has a better ranking than the 
other supplier in two out of three characteristics. As such, the monetary quantified information 
and the rankings are economically equivalent. In both conditions, subjects receive the current 
firm revenues
9.  
The  informal  control  mechanism  is  manipulated  by  a  scenario  and  is  based  on  the 
framework of Rousseau (1990) (see Appendix 1, Panel C). Rousseau (1990) argues that the 
informal context in an organization has five determinants: material artefacts (i.e. the physical 
manifestations of the informal context), patterns of activity (i.e. decision-making, coordination 
and  communication  mechanisms),  behavioral  norms  (i.e.  beliefs  of  employees  regarding 
acceptable  and  unacceptable  behavior),  values  (i.e.  priorities  assigned  to  certain  states  or 
                                                 
9 The current supplier is also mentioned in the rankings. However, subjects are told that the current supplier no 
longer produces the component and that one of both new suppliers has to be chosen. 22 
 
outcomes) and fundamental assumptions. In the condition with high (low) integration between 
purchasing and marketing, we manipulated the five elements towards high (low) integration. All 
other elements of the scenario are the same for both conditions. 
Dependent variable 
The purchase intention for both new suppliers is used to construct the dependent variable. We 
constructed a scale from zero to 100 where zero indicates a preference for the supplier that 
optimizes the performance of the purchasing department (i.e. supplier that causes the lowest 
cost) and 100 indicates a preference for the supplier that optimizes the performance of the firm as 
a whole (i.e. supplier that generates the highest profit). In other words, the higher the score for 
our dependent variable, the more the subjects integrate the revenue-generating possibilities of a 
supplier in their decision. For our statistical tests, we take for each subject the average score of 
the six supplier selections. We will call our dependent variable the degree of customer-oriented 
supplier selections. 
IV. RESULTS 
Manipulation checks and descriptive statistics 
To ensure that the experimental manipulations provided appropriate contrasts between different 
levels of incentives, information and informal control, we compared answers of the subjects on 
the manipulation checks. Results from t-tests indicated that the means of questions about the 
importance  of  cost  in  the  incentive  system,  the  easiness  to  integrate  information  about  the 
revenue-generating possibilities and the informal relations between marketing and purchasing 
were  significantly  different  in  the  predicted  direction  (p<0.0001  for  the  three  t-tests).  These 
results provide evidence for the different frames (individual versus group) that the treatments 
evoke.  Panel  A  of  Table  1  displays  the  means  and  standard  deviations  for  the  degree  of 23 
 
customer-oriented supplier selections as well as the number of subjects for each experimental 
condition.  At  first  blush,  the  means  reflect  the  patterns  that  we  expect.  For  both  informal 
contexts, we find that the combination in which both formal control mechanisms evoke a group 
frame leads to the highest degree of customer-oriented supplier selections. 
------------------------------------ 




Consistent with relational framing theory, Hypothesis 1 predicts that only the combination in 
which  both  formal  control  mechanisms  evoke  a  group  frame  will  lead  to  a  high  degree  of 
customer-oriented  supplier  selections.    As  Hypothesis  1  only  considers  formal  control 
mechanisms, we should find the predicted ordinal interaction for both levels of informal control. 
The significant interaction term between incentive system and information type for high cross-
functional  integration  (F=10.53,  p<0.01)  and  for  low  cross-functional  integration  (F=41.94, 
p<0.001) supports the prediction derived from relational framing theory (see Panel B and C of 
Table 1). Untabulated contrast analyses further confirm the significance of the predicted ordinal 
interaction (F=72.72, p<0.001 for high cross-functional integration and F=138.50, p<0.001 for 
low cross-functional integration)
10. We also find that the differences between combinations that 
contain at least one formal control mechanism that evokes an individual frame are not significant 
(F=1.85,  p>0.15  for  high  cross-functional  integration  and  F=0.23,  p>0.70  for  low  cross-
                                                 
10 In line with the predicted pattern for Hypothesis 1, we use the following contrast coefficients: -1 for the cell with a 
locallocal performance measure and rankings, - 1 for the cell with a local performance measure and monetary 
quantified information, -1 for the cell with an aggregate performance measure and rankings and 3 for the cell with 
an  aggregate  performance  measure  and  monetary  quantified  information. 
 24 
 
functional  integration).  Finally,  the  differences  between  the  combinations  of  formal  control 
mechanisms that evoke conflicting frames are also not statistically significant (t=0.59, p>0.50 for 
high cross-functional integration and t=0.50, p>0.60 for low cross-functional integration). This 
result  indicates  that  incongruence  between  formal  control  mechanisms  in  itself  and  not  a 
particular type of incongruence leads to a significant decrease in the degree of customer-oriented 
supplier  selections.  Although  this  result  is  in  line  with  relational  framing  theory,  it  is  in 
contradiction  with  traditional  purchasing  research,  which  argues  that  purchasing  employees 
always will follow their incentive system (Dumond, 1994).  
Hypothesis 2 only considers the combinations of formal control mechanisms that evoke 
conflicting frames and argues that the social context in which these combinations are embedded 
influences the strength of the dominance of the individual frame. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
we  find  a  significant  main  effect  in  the  predicted  direction  for  informal  control  (F=16.16, 
p<0.001), no effect for type of incongruence (F= 0.59, p>0.4) and no interaction effect between 
informal control and type of incongruence (F=0.00, p>0.95) (see Panel A, B and C of Table 2). 
This result implies that an informal context that promotes cross-functional integration limits the 
decrease in the degree of customer-oriented supplier selections caused by the conflicting frames 
of the formal control mechanisms. This finding also supports the argument that the informal 
control mechanism has an influence on the incongruence in  itself, rather than on a particular 
type of incongruence. 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 




The underlying reasoning for Hypothesis 2 states that people experiencing conflicting frames 
will consciously rely on the informal context. In order to detect whether conflicting frames will 
lead to a conscious reliance on the informal context, we compare the total response time for the 
six  supplier  selections  between  congruent  and  incongruent  conditions.  As  Smith  and  Henry 
(1996) found that the perception of conflict increases response time, we expect that subjects in 
incongruent conditions need more time to make a choice between the two suppliers than subjects 
in the congruent conditions. The increase in response time is caused by the fact that subjects in 
the incongruent conditions first should perceive the conflict and then have to consult the social 
context for guiding their decision. An analysis of the response times confirms our expectation. 
We find that subjects in incongruent conditions need on average 8.8% more time to make a 
supplier  choice  than  subjects  in  the  congruent  conditions.  The  difference  in  response  time 
between congruent and incongruent conditions is statistically significant (t=-1.83, p<.10).  
We  also  argue  that  the  conscious  reliance  on  the  informal  control  mechanism  will 
reframe both formal control mechanisms. Based on ex-post questions about the importance of 
cost versus profit in the supplier selection and with respect to the reliability of the data about the 
revenue-generating possibilities of suppliers, we find evidence for the proposed reframing. For 
both incongruent combinations, we observe a higher focus on profits (t=2.82, p<0.01 for the 
condition with local PM and monetary quantified information; t=3.32, p<0.01 for the condition 
with  aggregate  PM  and  rankings)  and  a  higher  reliability  of  the  data  about  the  revenue-
generating possibilities (t=4.15, p<0.01 for the condition with local PM and monetary quantified 
information; t=6.20, p<0.01 for the condition with aggregate PM and rankings) in the social 
context that promotes cross-functional integration (see Panel D, E and F of Table 2). 26 
 
In  sum,  our  results  confirm  that  the  individual  frame  dominates  if  formal  control 
mechanisms evoke conflicting frames, but we also show that the strength of the dominance of the 
individual frame is determined by the social context. Data about response times, perception of 
the  incentive  system  and  the  reliability  of  the  information  further  support  our  theoretical 
reasoning. 
The  third  hypothesis  only  considers  combinations  in  which  both  formal  control 
mechanisms evoke the same frame and predicts an additive influence of the informal control 
mechanism  when  the  informal  control  mechanism  is  in  line  with  the  frame  that  the  formal 
control mechanisms evoke. Analysis of the response times confirms our expectation that this 
additive effect should be the result of the unconscious processing of the social context. However, 
the  results  of  a  two-way  ANOVA  with  the  type  of  congruence  (i.e.  both  formal  control 
mechanisms evoke either a group or individual frame) and alignment between the frame of the 
formal control mechanisms and the informal control mechanism can only partially support our 
hypothesis. As expected, we find that formal control mechanisms that evoke a group frame lead 
to a higher degree of customer-oriented supplier selections than formal control mechanisms that 
evoke  an  individual  frame  (F=260.25,  p<0.001),  but  the  interaction  effect  does  not  reach 
statistical significance (F=2.33, p>0.10) (see Panel A, B and C of Table 3). Further investigation 
of  this  unexpected  result  reveals  that  the  degree  of  customer-oriented  supplier  selections  is 
significantly different in the predicted direction for formal control mechanisms that evoke an 
individual  frame  (F=4.60,  p<0.05).  However,  we  do  not  observe  any  significant  difference 
between the conditions in which both formal control mechanisms evoke a group frame (F=0.24, 
p>0.60). The latter result implies that the decreasing influence of an informal context that does 
not promote cross-functional integration is absent when both formal control mechanisms evoke a 27 
 
group frame. In other words, a social context that promotes cross-functional integration is not 
necessary if both formal control mechanisms are oriented towards optimizing the performance of 
the firm as a whole. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Insert Table 3 about here  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Additional evidence about the role of the informal control mechanism 
In order to further assess the influence of the informal control mechanism, it is interesting to 
compare the magnitude of the influence of the informal control mechanism for congruent and 
incongruent  combinations  of  formal  control  mechanisms.  Based  on  our  theoretical 
argumentation, we expect that the informal control mechanism will have a greater influence for 
incongruent  combinations  of  formal  control  mechanisms.  A  comparison  of  the  degree  of 
customer-oriented  supplier  selections  for  congruent  and  incongruent  combinations  of  formal 
control mechanisms is consistent with this reasoning: an informal context that promotes cross-
functional integration increases the degree of customer-oriented supplier selections with 41.69% 
in  case  of  incongruent  formal  control  mechanisms,  while  this  increase  is  only  6.75%  for 
congruent formal control mechanisms. If we only include the combinations in which both formal 
control mechanisms evoke an individual frame, then a context that promotes cross-functional 
integration leads to an increase of 27.02% in the degree of customer-based supplier selections. 
In the ex-post questionnaire, we also asked some questions about the affective feelings of 
the subjects because Kida et al. (2001) find that affective feelings are an important determinant 
of decision-making behavior. We asked subjects to give a general rating about the marketing 
department and to indicate whether they would like to work in the organization that is described. 28 
 
We find that the informal context is the main driver for the  responses on these questions
11. 
Subjects in the conditions that have a high cross-functional integration give a higher rating to the 
marketing  department  (F=101.56,  p<0.001)  and  have  a  higher  preference  to  work  in  the 
organization that is described (F=75.78, p<0.001). These results emphasize again the important 
role of the informal control mechanism.  
 
V. DISCUSSION 
Extant literature documents an important role for internal integration. Our paper shifts the focus 
to  the  role  of  management  control  mechanisms  in  creating  integration  between  different 
functional  departments.  Relying  on  the  distinction  between  formal  and  informal  control 
mechanisms and on the social psychological theory of relational framing, we find consistent 
evidence that the frame that formal control mechanisms evoke (i.e. whether they evoke a group 
or an individual frame) impacts the degree of integration between purchasing and marketing. 
Interestingly, our results suggest that the informal control mechanism is most important when 
formal control mechanisms are not congruently designed, while the informal control mechanism 
does  not  influence  integration  when  both  formal  control  mechanisms  are  oriented  towards 
optimizing the performance of the firm as a whole. 
Findings and implications 
The results of our first hypothesis confirm the basic premises of relational framing theory in a 
context of supplier selection. Importantly, we find that incongruence between different formal 
                                                 
11 ANOVA-analyses with informal control, information, incentive system and all possible interactions reveal that 
only the main term of informal control is statistically significant in explaining the subject’s answers on both ex-post 
questions. 29 
 
control  mechanisms  drives  employees’  decisions  and  that  there  is  no  distinction  between 
different types of incongruent combinations of formal control mechanisms. The main implication 
of this result is that formal control mechanisms cannot be considered in isolation. For instance, 
installing reward systems based on group performance without adapting the type of information 
that is exchanged will not lead to an increase in the degree of internal integration. Thus, although 
information systems decrease the cost of information transmission, companies should ensure that 
the exchanged information is understandable. Quantifying the consequences of cross-functional 
decisions in monetary terms seems to be a possible solution to increase the understandability of 
the exchanged information. Our results also imply that exchanging understandable information 
without giving monetary incentives to use this information will not lead to the expected increase 
in internal integration.  
The results for our second and third hypothesis shed light on the role of the informal 
control mechanism for different combinations of formal control mechanisms. For incongruent 
formal  control  mechanisms,  we  find  that  people  consciously  rely  on  the  informal  control 
mechanism which leads to a reframing of the formal control mechanism that is not in line with 
the message of the informal context. Taken together, the informal control mechanism is the main 
driver  of  behavior  in  case  of  incongruent  formal  control  mechanisms  and  the  decreasing 
influence of incongruent formal control mechanisms is partially offset by an informal context 
that  promotes  cross-functional  integration.  The  positive  influence  of  a  social  context  that 
promotes cross-functional integration for the combination of formal control mechanisms that 
exists of an aggregate performance measure and typical marketing information can be attributed 
to a higher reliability of the marketing information (Turner and Makhija, 2006). People subject to 
a local performance measure and monetary quantified information, on the other hand, sacrifice 30 
 
personal wealth in order to stick to the social norms if they operate in a context that promotes 
cross-functional integration. This result is in contradiction with traditional purchasing literature 
which  founds  that  employees  from  the  purchasing  department  always  follow  their  incentive 
system (Dumond, 1994). However, the result is in line with an emerging stream of literature 
which documents that the social context can stimulate the other-regarding preferences of people. 
  For congruent control mechanisms, we find that the unconscious reliance on the informal 
context  does  not  lead  to  any  differences  in  the  degree  of  internal integration  if  both  formal 
control  mechanisms  evoke  a  group  frame.  This  result  is  important  because  it  suggests  that 
companies  can  obtain  the  first-best  solution  if  the  different  formal  control  mechanisms  are 
perfectly aligned and oriented towards optimizing firm profit. 
Contributions 
This study fits into the recent stream of research that combines theories from social psychology 
with concepts from the management control literature to investigate issues in operations. Given 
its  interdisciplinary nature, this study adds to several streams of the literature. First, we add to 
the operations literature about internal integration. While much of the existing research in this 
area focuses on the consequences of variations in internal integration (Flynn et al., 2009; Zhao et 
al., 2010), our study shifts the focus to an important determinant of internal integration (i.e. 
control mechanisms). As we explain variations in internal integration by behavioral factors, our 
study adds to the emerging literature about behavioral operations (Bendoly et al., 2010). Also our 
focus on the purchasing-marketing interface tries to fill a gap in the current operations literature 
(Sheth et al., 2009). As the focus on outsourcing increases the influence of suppliers on the 
quality  of  the  supplied  goods  and  services,  effective  governance  of  the  interface  between 31 
 
purchasing  and  marketing  promises  to  be  an  important  determinant  of  the  firm’s  customer 
satisfaction and overall performance (Zhao et al., 2010).  
This  study  also  adds  to  the  extant  literature  about  management  control  mechanisms. 
Previous literature has provided mixed evidence about the importance of formal and informal 
control mechanisms for governing different types of relationships. Maltz and Kohli (1996), for 
instance, found that formal controls are more important than the informal control, while Anand et 
al. (2009) and Cousins et al. (2006) observe that the reverse is true. In addition, extant research 
often  assumes  perfect  alignment  between  different  formal  control  mechanisms  (Doerr  et  al., 
1996) or considers formal control as one coherent construct. In this study, we seek to paint a 
more complete picture of the role of formal and informal control mechanisms by investigating 
the  role  of  the  informal  control  mechanism  for  different  combinations  of  formal  control 
mechanisms (congruent versus incongruent combinations). Considering combinations of formal 
control  mechanisms  instead  of  assuming  formal  control  as  one  coherent  construct  is  also 
consistent  with  recent  views  that  firms  are  implementing  packages  of  control  mechanisms 
(Merchant  and  Van  der  Stede,  2007).  Our  results  can  explain  the  mixed evidence  of  earlier 
studies  as  one  can  argue  that  studies  observing  an  important  role  for  the  informal  control 
mechanism  are  considering  situations  with  incongruent  formal  control  mechanisms,  while 
studies observing no role for the informal control mechanism are considering situations with 
congruent formal control mechanisms. Therefore, future research should explicitly control for 
the congruency of formal control mechanisms when analyzing the role of the informal control 
mechanism. Our results also lend support to the argument that organizations do not need an 
informal control mechanism to improve integration under equilibrium conditions (under which 
formal control mechanisms should be perfectly aligned). However, organizations operating in a 32 
 
state of disequilibrium largely benefit from an informal context that promotes cross-functional 
integration.  As  most  organizations  are  constantly  switching  between  equilibrium  and 
disequilibrium, investments in promoting cross-functional integration are fruitful.  
Our  study  also  develops  an  own  theory  about  judgment  and  decision-making  in  an 
operations context by combining relational framing theory with a factor that is unique for an 
operations  environment.  Although  the  distinction  between  formal  and  informal  control 
mechanisms  is  well-documented  in  management  control  and  operations  literature,  previous 
research about relational framing does not make this distinction. In summary, introducing formal 
and informal control mechanisms in relational framing theory extends the theory in itself and 
makes it possible to draw a more complete picture about judgment and decision-making in an 
operations context. 
Limitations and further research 
This study has its limitations, which provide opportunities for further research. First, we only test 
the role of the informal control mechanism for packages of formal control mechanisms that 
consist of two formal control mechanisms. As organizations imply more than two formal control 
mechanisms, our experimental context is a simplification and the question remains open to which 
extent our results can be generalized to more complex situations. Relying on relational framing 
theory, which argues that incongruence in itself drives behavior, we hypothesize that the addition 
of extra formal control will not change the results. However, testing the boundary conditions of a 
theory is an important task for researchers.  
Second,  our  experimental  design  does  not  allow  for  interaction  and  exchange  of 
information between purchasing and marketing as we want to focus on the interpretation of the 
exchanged knowledge and avoid confounding of the results by different revelations of private 33 
 
information between experimental conditions. Further research can add the stage in which the 
marketing department can decide to exchange information about customer preferences. 
Third, the link between a supplier and the revenues that he generates was very clear in 
our experiment. We acknowledge that this is not always the case in reality but it is a unique 
feature  of  the  experimental  research  method  to  test  a  theory  under  simplifying  assumptions. 
Further  research  can  investigate  how  the  complexity  of  the  link  between  a  supplier  and  the 
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Results for Hypothesis 1 
Panel A shows the average degree of customer-based supplier selections for the eight experimental conditions. The 
cells also contain (standard deviation) and [number of participants]. Numbers in italic represent the results for the 
conditions with low cross-functional integration. Panel B and Panel C contain the ANOVA-analyses for high and 
low  cross-functional  integration.  Panel  D  presents  a  graph  of  the  average  degree  of  customer-based  supplier 
selections for high and low cross-functional integration. Numbers in italic represent the result for the low cross-
functional integration condition. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
    Information   

































































Panel B: Anova-analysis high cross-functional integration 
  SS  Df  MS  F-stat  p-value 
Incentive system  14656.95  1  14656.95  27.42  <.0001 
Information  20422.43  1  20422.43  38.20  <.0001 
Incentive system x Information  5628.22  1  5628.22  10.53  <0.005 
Explained  40976.14  3  13658.71  25.55  <.0001 
Residual  96225.64  180  534.59     
 
 
Panel C: Anova-analysis low cross-functional integration 
  SS  Df  MS  F-stat  p-value 
Incentive System  25632.18  1  25632.18  43.38  <.0001 
Information  32656.03  1  32656.03  55.26  <.0001 
Incentive System x Information  24784.02  1  24784.02  41.94  <.0001 
Explained  82169.69  3  27389.90  46.35  <.0001 







































Results for Hypothesis 2 
Panel A shows the average degree of customer-based supplier selections for the experimental conditions in which 
formal  control  mechanisms  are  incongruent.  The  cells  also  contain  (standard  deviation)  and  [number  of 
participants]. Panel B contains the ANOVA-analysis. Panel C presents a graph of the average degree of customer-
based supplier selections. Panel D and Panel E contain statistics for the ex-post questions about the reframing of the 
formal control mechanisms. Panel F presents a graph of the results for these ex-post questions. 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics Hypothesis 2 
 
    Information   




































Aggregate PM + 
rankings 























Panel B: ANOVA-analysis Hypothesis 2 
 
  SS  Df  MS  F-stat  p-value 
Informal Control  12496.9977  1  12496.9977  16.16  <.0001 
Type of Incongruence  454.30992  1  454.30992  0.59  0.4444 
Informal Control x 
Type of Incongruence 
0.35155  1  0.35155  0.00  0.9830 
Explained  12978.8750  3  4326.2917  5.59  <0.005 















Panel D: Ex-Post Questions for Reframing of the Formal Control Mechanisms (Local 
Performance Measure and Monetary Quantified Information) 






t-value  p-value 
Profit-focus  89.14  74.39  2.82  <0.01 
Reliability marketing 
information 
64.22  46.43  4.15  <0.001 
 
Panel E: Ex-Post Questions for Reframing of the Formal Control Mechanisms (Aggregate 
performance measure and rankings) 






t-value  p-value 
Profit-focus  91.7  74.22  3.32  <0.005 
Reliability of 
marketing information 




































Results for Hypothesis 3 
Panel A shows the average degree of customer-based supplier selections for the experimental conditions in which 
formal control mechanisms are congruent. The cells also contain (standard deviation) and [number of participants]. 
Panel B contains the ANOVA-analysis. Panel C presents a graph of the average degree of customer-based supplier 
selections.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics Hypothesis 3 
 
    Type of congruence 
(formal controls) 
 


































Panel B: ANOVA-analysis Hypothesis 3  
  SS  Df  MS  F-stat  p-value 
Type of congruence 
(formal controls) 
90703.6266  1  90703.6266  260.25  <.0001 
Formal-informal 
congruence 
1491.51768  1  1491.51768  4.28  <0.05 
Type of congruence x 
Formal-informal 
congruence 
812.81768  1  812.81768  2.33  0.1285 
Explained  93411.5527  3  31137.1842  89.34  <.0001 



























Panel A: Incentive system 
Local PM 
(cost-based) 
Total cost of the supplier – (0.1 x revenues of the 
chosen supplier) 




Revenues of the chosen supplier  -  total cost of 
the selected supplier 
The higher, the better. 
 
Panel B: Information system 
  Total cost information  Customer-related information
1 
  Total cost  Change  in  total 
cost 
Revenues  Change in revenues 
Current supplier  60 000 EUR    70 000 EUR   
New supplier I  64 200 EUR  + 4 200 EUR  77 200 EUR  + 7 200 EUR 
New supplier II  61 200 EUR  + 1 200 EUR  71 800 EUR  + 1 800 EUR 
1 Shaded areas are condition specific. In the monetary quantification – condition, subjects receive 
the information in the shaded areas. In the rankings – condition, subjects receive the customer-
related information as follows: 
 
Customer-based information 
  Supplier I  Supplier II  Current supplier 
Durability  1  2  3 
Strenght  1  2  3 
Maintenance  2  1  3 
 
Panel C: Informal control 
Low cross-functional 
integration 
Informal element  High cross-functional 
integration 
Purchasing and marketing are 
located in a different building. 
Material artefacts  Purchasing and marketing are located 
in the same building. 
2 times a year, there is a meeting to 
discuss problems. However, 





There is a weekly meeting to discuss 
problems and to search for solutions. 
There are less informal contacts 
between the purchasing and 
marketing department. 
Behavioral norms  There are a lot of informal contacts 
between the purchasing and marketing 
department. 
Cross-functional collaboration is not 
the most important aspect in your 
organization. Everyone is convinced 
that a focus on the activities of the 
own department will lead to good 
results. 
Values  Cross-functional collaboration is 
considered as fundamental to obtain 
good results. 
Your organization is founded by 1 
man who was convinced that 
specialization on the tasks of the 




Your organization is founded by 2 
brothers who have always collaborated 
and have stimulated cross-functional 
integrations. 46 
 
 